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STUDENT NOTES




Last August, Congress passed and the President signed the
Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 ("the Personal Responsibility Act"),1 supposedly chang-
ing welfare as we know it. In so doing, the Personal Responsibil-
ity Act also changed welfare as "they" know it; among other
welfare restrictions, the Act strictly curtails the availability of enti-
tlements to immigrants. A legal immigrant entering the United
States now faces a five-year ban on federal public benefits.2 A
similar provision of the Act allows the individual states to set
equally strict eligibility standards for state and local benefits.3 In
addition, the Act completely bars illegal immigrants from both
federal and state benefits.4
The motivations behind this strict policy are clearly voiced in
the introduction to Title IV of the Personal Responsibility Act,
which centers on immigration and welfare: "It continues to be
the immigration policy of the United States that.., aliens within
the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to meet
their needs . . . and . . . the availability of public benefits not
constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States."
5
The preamble to Title IV articulates a basic fear that drives
the new United States policy: the US does not want costly welfare
programs to attract benefit-hungry immigrants. This apprehen-
* B.A., University of Arizona; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1995-1997; J.D.
Candidate, 1997, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Sat 2105 (1996) [hereinafter Personal
Responsibility Act].
2. Id. at § 403(a). Some narrowly defined exceptions follow this
provision.
3. Id. at § 412(a).
4. Id. at §§ 401, 411.
5. Id. at § 400(2) (A) & (B).
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sion is not the exclusive property of the United States. The
United Kingdom (UK) recently reformed its welfare system in
order to eliminate what it saw as an incentive for European
nationals to come to Britain on a "benefit holiday." In 1994, the
UK Secretary of State for Social Security established a new policy
to control the distribution of income and housing benefits.
Effective in August of that year, all persons who apply for govern-
ment aid must pass a test of "habitual residence" to prove their
residency status in the UK. 6 The test represents an aggressive
effort by the British government to deter "benefit tourists:" Euro-
pean Union (EU) 7 nationals who come to the UK seeking work,
but who ultimately end up unemployed, homeless, and potential
recipients of entitlements in Britain.8
Government ministers and the popular press portrayed ben-
efit tourism as a common and well-known problem.9 The new
policy has come to symbolize the latest battle in the constant
struggle between "Europhiles" (those in favor of a strong Euro-
pean Union) and "Eurosceptics" (those of a more isolationist
bent who would rather see the Union weakened or even cease to
exist). At the same time, the habitual residence test marked
6. "Habitual residence" is not defined by UK government documents or
legislation. However, the Department of Social Security lists five criteria for
establishing habitual residence: the applicant's "centre of interest,"
employment record, length and continuity of residence elsewhere, reason for
coming to the UK, and future intentions. The Habitual Residence Test: One Year
on, WFARE RIGHTS BULLETIN, June 1995, at 7. For a discussion of how habitual
residence determinations are made, see infra part IV.
7. Actually, the policy targets nationals of the European Economic Area
(EEA), which comprises a larger set of European members than the EU. As of
this writing, the EEA includes all the European Union member states (France,
the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Republic of Ireland, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, and Greece) as well as Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein. For the
purposes of this analysis, no distinction will be drawn between the EEA and the
EU.
In addition, it should be noted that when the Maastricht Treaty became
effective in November 1993, the UK became part of the European Union (EU),
previously named the European Community (EC). Most of the relevant case
law still refers to the EC rather than the EU. For the sake of clarity, all
references to the EC have been changed to the more appropriate EU moniker.
8. Britain Tests Residency to Stop "Benefit Tourists, " REUTER EUR. COMMUNrTY
REP., Feb. 4, 1994. The term was publicly introduced in 1993 by Peter Lilley,
former UK Secretary of State for Social Security. See Michael Adler, The
Habitual Residence Test: A Critical Analysis, 2J. Soc. SEc. LAw 179, 179-80 (1995).
9. SeeJohn Hamshire, Your Holiday's Over, Euro Spongers Told, DAILY MAIL,
Oct. 6, 1995, at 2; Peter Lilley Clamps Down on Benefit Tourism, REUTER TEXTLINE
HERmEs-UK GOV'T PREss RELEASES, July 11, 1994 (LEXIS, Indaw library,
ECNews file).
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changes in the distribution of welfare benefits in the UK.
Accompanying these changes were structural defects in the dis-
bursement of benefits, as well as adverse consequences not only
for some EU nationals, but for many UK citizens as well. The
resulting legal challenges and criticism of the policy over the last
three years have cast significant doubts on the viability of the
habitual residence test and the effectiveness of the British gov-
ernment's policy against benefit tourism.
Unlike the sweeping and much deliberated welfare legisla-
tion passed by the United States Congress, the habitual residence
test represents a more administrative, less consistent application
of welfare reform policy. The following analysis presents an over-
view of the benefit tourism policy as it has been applied by the
UK government since 1994. Part II provides a brief background
of the UK's role in the EU. That role gives one explanation for
the less consistent nature of the benefit tourism policy; namely,
the UK is somewhat limited in its ability to control the flow of
immigration and the disbursement of benefits due to its mem-
bership in the EU. '
Part III explains some of the structural problems inherent
not only in the new benefit tourism policy, but in the disburse-
ment of entitlements in the UK generally. The system in place
creates a potential for conflict among government entities on
local, national, and supranational levels. This part lays the
groundwork for an analysis of the benefit tourism policy as it has
been applied to both housing and income support benefits in
the UK.
Part IV gives a synopsis of a recent report by the National
Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux (NACAB), a prominent
citizens' watchdog group. The NACAB report gives a damning
review of the habitual residence test and its role in the UK gov-
ernment's plan to stop benefit tourism. The report details how
the test has been inconsistently applied, revealing structural
problems in general, as well as specific instances where the habit-
ual residence test has backfired in its application and resulted in
harm to UK nationals rather than the intended "Euros-
crounger"10 targets.
Part V analyzes three recent legal challenges to the habitual
residence test. The test survived its first legal challenge,
although a later case indicates that the habitual residence test
may be short-lived. Most significantly, the test is currently under
10. See David Brindle, Britons Hit by "Tourist Benefit" Cut, GuARDIAN, Feb.
14, 1996, at 11.
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consideration by the European Court ofJustice. 11 That body has
not yet reached a decision on the issue, but the result likely will
either obliterate or entrench the habitual residence test.
Finally, Part VI provides some suggestions for how the UK
government could better implement the benefit tourism policy.
This part will also briefly discuss what the United States can learn
from the UK welfare system. Though the impetus behind the
reform movements in the two countries may be the same, the US
and UK governments have handled the perceived problem in
very different ways. The shortcomings of the benefit tourism pol-
icy and the difficulties surrounding its implementation should
serve as a warning to US legislators and policy-makers not to fall
into the same structural and administrative quicksand that has
muddled the UK welfare system for the past three years.
II. GETTING AROUND THE EU
A. Freedom of Movement
The habitual residence test has some basis in EU law. Gen-
erally, European Union citizens have the right to freedom of
movement within the Member States of the EU. 12 However, that
right is not absolute. Article 8(a) (1) of the European Union
Treaty holds the rights of EU nationals "subject to the limitations
and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures
adopted to give it effect.""3 United Kingdom courts have inter-
preted this article to mean that there is not an "unqualified right
of every citizen of the European Union to reside in any Member
State as and when he may wish." 4
B. Exceptions to Freedom of Movement
The United Kingdom is not the first European country to
attempt the application of an habitual residence test. In Di Paulo
v. Office National de l'Emploi,'5 the European Court ofJustice con-
sidered the validity of a Belgian law requiring all its benefit recip-
11. As a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom agrees to
submit to EU law, effectively making the European Court ofJustice the court of
last resort in the UK. For a brief discussion of the European Court of Justice
and how it decides cases, see JOSHUA ROZENBERG, THE SEARCH FOR JusTICE 202-
204 (1994).
12. Tasxr_ ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC Cormmu~rv [EU
TAriy] art. 48 (as amended 1991).
13. EU TiArv art. 8(a)(1).
14. R. v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Tristan-Garcia, 28
H.L.R_ 125, 1995 Queen's Bench Division (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file). See
infra part V.B.
15. Case 76/76, 2 C.M.L.R. 59 (1977).
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ients to be habitually resident in Belgium. Silvana Di Paulo, an
Italian national who was raised in Belgium, was denied unem-
ployment benefits in Belgium after working in Britain for a
year."6 The court explained the general rule that the country
where a European national works should be the country to pro-
vide benefits. 17 However, the court then stated that an exception
exists whereby a worker may show habitual residence in a country
other than where he or she was last employed. 8 When deter-
mining habitual residence, the court suggested looking at a per-
son's "habitual centre of interest... the length and continuity of
residence . . . the length and purpose of his absence, the nature
of the occupation found in the other [M]ember-State and the
intention of the person concerned as it appears from all the
circumstances." 9
Though the European Court of Justice in Di Paulo allowed
an exception to the general rule, the court warned that the
exception would be rare, and still held to the presumption that a
worker resides in the country where he or she works.2 ° Despite
its narrow holding, Di Paulo allowed other EU nations to tinker
with the concept of habitual residence.
Throughout its history as a member of the European Union,
the UK has developed its own exceptions to the freedom of
movement doctrine. The UK Immigration Rules2 outline the
qualifications necessary for an EU national to be "lawfully pres-
ent" in the UK The rules state that "a national of a Member
State of the European Union is entitled to admission to take or
seek employment, to set up in business, to become self-employed
or otherwise to exercise the right of establishment or the rights
relating to the provision or receipt of services as provided in
[EU] law."22 However, the UK gives EU nationals a limited win-
dow within which to gain employment. A person admitted under
the rules may remain in the UK for a maximum of six months,
16. Id. at 60.
17. Id. at 71.
18. Id. at 71-72.
19. Id. at 73. Note the similarity between this list and the list provided by
the UK Department of Social Security in connection with the UK habitual
residence test, supra note 6.
20. 1& at 72.
21. Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules in Administration of the
Immigration Act 1971 for Regulating Entry into and Stay of Persons in the
United Kingdom, H.C. 251 (1990) [hereinafter Statement of Changes in
Immigration Rules].
22. Id. at para. 69.
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after which time that person must apply for a UK residence
permit.
23
A residence permit will be issued to an EU national if the
person is employed, has "established himself in business" or is
otherwise established financially, or if the person has a family
member who is employed or otherwise established in the UK.
24
The residence permit normally will be issued for a five-year
term.2' The national may be forced to leave the United King-
dom "if, after six months from admission, he fails to meet [these]
requirements ... 26 Moreover, if the national has become a
"charge on public funds," a residence permit most likely will not
be granted, even if the six-month limitation has not yet passed.27
Before the habitual residence test was put in place, EU
nationals were allowed to claim government benefits for the first
six months after their arrival in the UK 28 If an EU national was
not employed within six months, or failed to show he or she was
actively looking for work throughout the six-month period, the
benefit authorities would notify the Home Office, 29 which would
send a letter requiring the EU national to leave the country.3 °
C. EU Acceptance of UK Limitations on Freedom of Movement
The Immigration Rules curtail the EU Treaty's avowed aim
of "freedom of movement" for citizens of Member States. How-
ever, the European Court of Justice gave a qualified acceptance
to the UK's six-month limit in P? v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex
p. Antonissen.31 Dutch citizen GustaafAntonissen appealed to the
Queen's Bench Division of the United Kingdom's High Court in
an attempt to overturn his deportation by an immigration appeal
tribunal. The tribunal declared that Antonissen could not law-
fully reside in the United Kingdom because he had been unem-
23. Id. at para. 72.
24. Id. at para. 147.
25. I. at para. 148. If the duration of employment is expected to be
shorter than five years, the term of the permit will match the expected length of
employment.
26. Id. at para. 150.
27. Id.
28. See infra part H.C.
29. See PHILIP NORTON, THE BRrrISH PoLITY 190 tbl. 8.6 (3d ed. 1994)
(defining the Home Office as an executive agency fulfilling "domestic functions
not assigned to other departments, including administration of justice, police,
immigration, public safety and morals, and prisons") [hereinafter BmrriSH
Poir].
30. For a more detailed discussion of the Home Office and its
immigration policies, see infra part V.B.
31. Case C-292/89, 2 C.M.L.R. 373 (1991).
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ployed for over six months.3 2 Antonissen argued that the six-
month limitation violated EU law. The High Court refused to
decide the question, as there was no clear rule of law on the
issue, and the case was transferred to the European Court of
Justice.
The European Court admitted there was no clear rule of EU
law governing time limits on the right of residence for EU
nationals in a foreign Member State. However, the court quickly
silenced the notion that Member States should be free to legis-
late their own guidelines on the right of residence. The court
feared this would lead to "national laws which would thus be able
to exclude at will certain categories of person from the benefit of
the [EU] Treaty."3
As a compromise, the court declared the UK six-month limi-
tation "does not appear in principle to be insufficient to enable
the persons concerned to apprise themselves . . .of offers of
employment... and, therefore, does notjeopardise the effective-
ness of the principle of free movement."34 The court qualified
this statement by giving alleged "overstayers" (EU nationals who
stay in the UK without a permit longer than six months) a
chance to prove their continuing efforts to get ajob. If such con-
tinuing efforts are shown, the UK cannot force an overstayer to
leave.
The Antonissen court acknowledged the possibility of benefit
tourism, which it described as "the risk of persons moving to
another Member State under cover of looking-in actual fact,
not very actively-for employment in order to receive the social
benefits provided for under the legislation of the host State."
3 5
However, the court dismissed that risk as minimal. The court
reasoned that national authorities that make the proper inquiries
should be able to "identify those persons who are not genuinely
looking for employment. Such persons could not claim a right
of residence, even if they recently arrived in the host State, or as
a result abuse the social advantages accruing under national
law."
36
32. Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, supra note 21, at para.
150. Normally overstayers are not deported. Antonissen was deported because
he had recently been convicted of cocaine possession and was deemed a danger
to the public health.
33. 2 C.M.L.R_ at 390 (quoting Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van
Justitie, 2 C.M.L.R. 454 (1982)).
34. 2 C.M.L.R. at 400.
35. Id. at 394.
36. Case C-292/89, R_ v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p. Antonissen,
2 C.M.L.R. 373, 395 (1991).
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The European Court placed its faith in the ability of national
authorities to discover and expel benefit tourists without slight-
ing the overriding principle of freedom of movement. However,
a closer look at UK practice reveals an important difference
between the Antonissen ruling and reality.
III. UK HOUSING POLICY-A Mix OF LoCAL AND NATIONAL
DECISION-MAKING
The two main entitlements affected by the government's
habitual residence policy are income support benefits and hous-
ing benefits. 7 Eligibility for income support is determined by
the national Benefits Agency. The Benefits Agency receives its
legal guidance from the Central Adjudication Service, also a
national agency. Thus, income support benefits are determined
at a national level."8 Housing benefits, on the other hand, are
administered at a local level by the housing councils of various
cities in the UK.
The controlling statute regarding homelessness in the
United Kingdom is the Housing Act 1985 ("the Housing Act"). 9
Local housing councils follow the guidelines in the Housing Act
when considering an application for housing benefits. Housing
authorities also rely on the Code of Guidance ("the Code")
issued to councils and updated periodically by the Department of
Social Security.40 The Code is not binding on housing coun-
cils,4 1 though it is followed as a matter of course, primarily
because housing councils may be required to justify any devia-
tions from the Code on review.42 An examination of case law
illustrates that local authorities control the process of granting
and denying housing benefits, even when EU nationals are
involved.
37. The policy also affects disbursements covering the "council tax"
charged by local councils. The council tax will be ignored for the purposes of
this analysis.
38. For a more detailed discussion of income support benefits and the
Benefits Agency, see infra part IV.
39. Housing Act, 1985, ch. 68 (Eng.) [hereinafter Housing Act]. The
Housing Act was revised last year to include, among other changes, the
restrictions on non-British housing benefit applicants. However, because the
benefit applicants discussed infra applied under the 1985 statute, this analysis
refers to the older version of the Housing Act. See, e.g., Housing Act, 1996, ch.
52, § 185 (Eng.) ("Persons from Abroad Not Eligible for Housing Assistance").
40. Housing Act, supra note 39, at § 71(1) & (2).
41. DeFalco, Silvestri v. Crawley Borough Council, 1 All E.RI 913, 921
(1980).
42. R. v. Newham Borough Council, ex p. Bones, 25 H.L.R_ 357, 1992
Queen's Bench Division (LEXIS, Intlaw library, Engcas file).
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A. Intentional Homelessness-Local Control
Local councils owe no duty to an applicant determined to be
intentionally homeless.4" Applicants who have deliberately done
or failed to do something that has resulted in loss of accommoda-
tion are considered intentionally homeless and ineligible for
benefits.44 In DeFalco, Silvestri v. Crawley Borough Council,45 a local
housing council held two Italians to be intentionally homeless
because they had moved to the UK from Italy without first acquir-
ing permanent accommodation. The Italians sought appeal,
claiming that the housing council had denied them access to
housing because of their nationality, and that the Code and EU
law made clear that their nationality should not have been an
issue. They referred to Section 2.18 of the Code, which states
that a housing authority should consider only the "most immedi-
ate cause" of homelessness, rather than a series of prior events.4 6
For DeFalco and Silvestri, this likely would have meant they
would not be held intentionally homeless under the Act, because
they lost their accommodation most recently in the UK due to
family difficulties. In addition, they pointed to EU Council Regu-
lation 1612/68,"7 which gives EU workers the same access to
housing and social security benefits to which UK nationals are
entitled.4 8
The Court of Appeal upheld the housing authority's deci-
sion. The leading judgment explained away the relevant Code
section and held that housing authorities are not officially bound
by the Code. The judgment stated that Section 2.18 "may be all
very well for people coming from Yorkshire or any other part of
England. But it should not . . .be applied to people coming
from Italy, or any other country of the Common Market."4 9
Warning against the "advancing tide""0 of EU nationals in Brit-
ain, the judgment contended that EU law actually treats EU
workers more favorably than it treats UK citizens in some circum-
stances, because housing authorities "cannot rely on . . . the Act
to throw responsibility on to the housing authority of some other
area."
5 1
43. Housing Act, supra note 39, at § 60 (general note following text).
44. Id. at § 60(1).
45. 1 All E.R. 913 (1980).
46. Id. at 921.
47. Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L 257).
48. Id; see 1 All E.R. at 924.
49. 1 E.R. at 921.
50. DeFalco, Silvestri v. Crawley Borough Council, 1 All E.R. 913, 917
(1980).
51. Id. at 926.
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DeFalco signified the power of the local housing council to
decide matters of benefit distribution, regardless of the appli-
cant's status as an EU national. The language of the DeFalco deci-
sion may have provided a clue as to how such applications might
be processed throughout the EU. The following case, decided
shortly before DeFalco, better explains how cooperation among
the EU nations might allow UK housing councils to rely on the
Housing Act to "throw responsibility" to other areas of the EU.
B. The Local Connection Standard-Possible Broad EU Application
A housing council may require an applicant to show ties to
the area in order to receive housing benefits. The Housing Act
states that for an applicant to establish a local connection to a
particular housing council, the applicant must either normally
reside in the council's district, be employed in the district, have
family in the district, or have other special circumstances that tie
the applicant to that district.52 If a housing authority determines
that the applicant has a local connection elsewhere in the UK,
the application may be transferred to the authority in charge of
housing in that area. Whether to apply the local connection
inquiry is wholly at the discretion of the housing council. 53
In P?. v. Bristol City Council ex p. Browne,54 responsibility for
housing an Irish applicant was transferred from England to the
Republic of Ireland because the applicant had no local connec-
tion in the UK 55 The Bristol housing authorities contacted the
relevant housing council in Ireland and received assurance that
the applicant would receive housing upon her return to Ire-
land.56 Though the applicant did not wish to return to Ireland,
the Bristol authorities decided they had no further duty to the
applicant under the Housing Act. In a strictly limited holding,
the trial court upheld the housing authority's decision to effec-
tively transfer the housing application out of the UK 57
An expansive reading of the Browne decision implies that
housing applications from EU nationals in the UK might be
transferred to the applicant's home country under an EU-wide
"local connection" standard. No judicial body has yet considered
what relationship, if any, exists between the local connection
standard and the habitual residence test. The Browne case does
52. Housing Act, supra note 39, at § 61.
53. Id. at § 62(2); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING; LAw AND PRAcTICE § 14-115
(Andrew Arden & Martin Partington eds., Supp. June 1995).
54. 3 All E.R. 344 (1979).
55. Id. at 348-49.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 350-51.
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little to aid in this context, both because it was decided several
years before the benefit tourism policy came into effect, and
because citizens of the Irish Republic are exempt from the habit-
ual residence test.58 However, the ability to transfer applications
to other EU countries under the Browne standard might elimi-
nate the need for the current policy; true "Euroscroungers"
could be sent home to receive their benefits.
C. Local Authorities and Immigration-Tower Hamlets
As seen in Browne and DeFalco, local housing councils are
free to inquire about an applicant's qualifications for benefits.
Housing councils may also ask about the immigration status of an
applicant who may have overstayed or gained illegal entry to the
UK. When councils process an application, they are told "to
inquire into the immigration status of the applicant, and indeed
it would seem that where it comes to the attention of the author-
ity that an applicant may be an illegal immigrant they are under a
duty to inform the immigration authorities of this fact." 9 The
fact that this power, officially reserved for the national immigra-
tion authorities, is instead carried out by local authorities raises
some question about whether the UK is following the spirit of the
Antonissen ruling. The following case exemplifies the UK courts'
willingness to give local authorities the power to decide the immi-
gration status of members of a supranational organization.
In R. v. Secretary of Statefor the Environment ex p. Tower Hamlets
London Borough Council,6  the United Kingdom Court of Appeal
overturned a High Court decision limiting the powers of local
housing councils. In Tower Hamlets, the Secretary of State agreed
housing authorities could inquire about the immigration status of
applicants, and confirmed there was no duty under the Housing
Act to house an illegal immigrant.6' But the Secretary argued
58. Though the Republic of Ireland is a member of the European Union,
Irish citizens have traditionally been free from restrictions on right of entry into
the UK, at least insofar as their status as EU nationals is concerned. This
exemption stems from the close historical ties between the two countries.
Other European countries have developed such exemptions with neighboring
states. See Peter Liley Clamps Down on Benefit Tourism, REUTER TEXTLINE
HERMEs-UK GOV'T PRESS RELEASES, July 11, 1994 (LEXIS, Indaw library,
ECNews file); R. v. Secretary of State for Soc. Sec., ex p. Sarwar & Another,
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Oct. 24, 1996) (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file)
(discussed infra part VA); Belgian State v. Humbel, 1 C.M.L.R. 393 (1989)
(discussed infra part V.B).
59. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING; LAw AND PRACTICE § 14-115 (Andrew
Arden & Martin Partington eds., Supp. June 1995).
60. 3 All E.R. 439 (1993).
61. Id. at 442-43.
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the Immigration and Nationality Department (IND) should be
the sole body with power to officially decide the issue of whether
an applicant is an illegal immigrant.6 2 The Secretary cited a por-
tion of the Code in favor of his proposition:
4.11 Authorities cannot refuse to rehouse a family because
they are immigrants. Everyone admitted to this country is
entitled to equal treatment under the law; their rights
under [the Housing Act] are no different from those of
any other person. Authorities should remember to treat as
confidential information received on an applicant's immi-
gration status....
4.12 Authorities should also however be aware that people
in the UK with limited leave to remain . . . may prejudice
their immigration status if they have recourse to public
funds .... If it therefore comes to light in the course of
investigations that an applicant may only have limited leave
to remain in the UK the housing officer should inform the
applicant that s/he may bejeopardising his/her status and
advise him/her to contact the Home Office or an
independent advice agency for help.
6 3
In the leading judgment, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith rejected
the Secretary of State's claim. The court held an applicant's
immigration status to be a factual matter, and stated that there
was nothing to indicate that immigration officials should be the
only ones qualified to rule on such status.' Moreover, the Lord
Justice asserted that local authorities will often be in a better
position to decide questions of immigration status: "It is the
housing authority rather than the immigration authority who will
most probably discover that there has been deception by the
immigrant . .. since it will be to it that an application will be
made.... It should not be necessary for them to refer the case
for decision to the immigration authorities with the consequent
delay involved." 5
The Tower Hamlets decision prompted a change in the Code
of Guidance. Sections 4.11 and 4.12 were eliminated from the
Code and were replaced with new sections which follow the Tower
Hamlets ruling. The new Code sections give local housing coun-
cils the power to decide whether an applicant entered illegally or
became an overstayer by residing in the United Kingdom longer
62. Id. at 443.
63. Department of Social Security Code of Guidance §§ 4.11-4.12 (1991)
(cited in 3 All E.R. at 441).
64. 3 All E.R. at 443-44.
65. 3 All E.R. 439, 446 (1993).
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than allowed under the national immigration rules. 66 The new
Code also states that while councils are under no duty to report
to IND, they should notify the department when decisions are
made regarding immigration status.6 7 The holding assured that
local housing council decisions would still be subject to review by
UK courts.
6 8
Local authorities thus have great power over the distribution
of housing benefits, as well as the responsibility of administering
the habitual residence test to housing applicants. However, as
will be seen in Part IV, housing benefits are but one aspect of the
welfare system. The habitual residence test also applies to
income benefit applications, which are governed by a separate
agency and set of guidelines.
IV. FAILING TIE TS.- THE NACAB REPORT
In February 1996, the National Association of Citizens
Advice Bureaux (NACAB) °9 published a report detailing the
effects of the benefit tourism policy on applicants for income
support benefits. The report, entitled Failing the Test,7° is based
on information gathered from 201 Citizens Advice Bureaux
throughout England and Wales. The report gives a scathing
review of the first eighteen months of the habitual residence test
used to determine eligibility for benefits. Throughout its analy-
sis, NACAB provides a number of minor recommendations for
better implementing the habitual residence test, but the primary
recommendation to the government is that the test be withdrawn
completely.
71
The NACAB report concludes that the habitual residence
test provides a poor means of deterring benefit tourism.72
NACAB points to a Social Security Advisory Committee report
from April 1994, just months before the habitual residence test
became effective:
[T]he effective application of existing powers should pro-
vide sufficient remedy for any potential abuse from [EU]
nationals seeking to take advantage of benefit tourism....
[I]t would be unduly harsh to apply an actively seeking
66. Department of Social Security Code of Guidance §§ 4.19-4.35 (1993).
67. Id. at § 4.30.
68. 3 All E.R. at 446.
69. NACAB is a watchdog organization that collects data and provides
information and advice regarding government programs.
70. Janet Allbeson, Failing the Test, NATIONAL ASS'N oF CmZENs ADVICE
BuREAUx, Feb. 1996 [hereinafter NACAB].
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at § 5.1.
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work test more stringently to everyone at a time of high
unemployment, in order to weed out a minority of benefit
tourists.
7 3
In short, the government's own advisory committee recom-
mended that the habitual residence test not be instituted in the
first place.
A. Structural Problems
In October 1995, a social security commissioner set forth cri-
teria for making the factual determination of habitual resi-
dence.7 ' The commissioner stated that the most important
factors for making this determination should be the length, con-
tinuity and general nature of the applicant's residence in the UK,
and that the intentions of the applicant should not play a pivotal
role. 75 These criteria differ somewhat from the Department of
Social Security criteria used by the Benefits Agency, which specif-
ically provide that intentions should be taken into account.
76
These conflicting guidelines bolster NACAB's argument that no
realistic working definition of habitual residence exists, which
leads to a great degree of subjectivity when applying the test.
7 7
In addition to the problem of subjectivity, a structural prob-
lem lurks in the application of the benefit tourism policy. The
policy was enacted to ensure that applicants for housing and
income support benefits would have to prove habitual residence
before receiving benefits. However, two separate agencies are
responsible for distribution of these entitlements and for the
administration of the habitual residence test. Local housing
councils are responsible for housing benefits, and they rely on
the Housing Act and the Code for guidance. The Benefits
Agency is responsible for income support benefits, and receives
advice from the Central Adjudication Service. 78 With two differ-
ent agencies, each of which receives direction from a separate
source, it is not surprising to find that occasionally the housing
councils and Benefits Agency reach different results with regard
to eligibility for benefits. The NACAB report gives evidence of
73. SOCIAL SECURrry ADVISORY COMMrrrEE, UK DEP'T OF SOC. SEC., THE
INCOME-RELATED BENEFrs SCHEMES (MscELLANous AMENDMENTS) (No. 3)
REGULATIONS 1994 (July 1994) [hereinafter SSAC] (cited in NACAB, supra note
70, at § 2.10).
74. NACAB, supra note 70, at § 3.11 (citing Case 82/95, Social Security
Commissioner (1995)).
75. Id.
76. See supra note 6.
77. NACAB, supra note 70, at § 3.14.
78. Id. at § 3.18.
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applicants who were declared habitually resident by the local




The original stated aim of the habitual residence test was to
prevent EU nationals from embarking on "benefit holidays" in
the UK. However, EU law prevents the government from apply-
ing the test in a sweeping fashion to all EU nationals in the UK,
each Member State must give EU workers the same access to ben-
efits that are given to its own citizens. 8° To clarify its adherence
to this requirement, the UK government altered the habitual res-
idence policy in March 1995, targeting only EU work seekers."' As
they are not entitled to the broad rights and benefits of EU work-
ers, 82 work seekers are still subject to the habitual residence test.
Despite the alteration of the policy in 1995, the habitual resi-
dence test still applies to UK citizens returning from abroad.
This has led to the confusing result of some EU nationals escap-
ing the test while UK citizens are forced to take it. The NACAB
report decries the habitual residence test both in its application
to work seekers and to UK citizens.
The NACAB report suggests the government should
broaden its focus with regard to benefit access by EU work seek-
ers. To make freedom of movement a reality for work seekers,
the report recommends that the UK government "work in con-
junction with other European states to ensure that the same pro-
tection of non-discrimination as regards social assistance now
given to European 'workers' is extended to genuine work seek-
ers .... "88 This goal would be better served, the report argues, by
helping its own citizens abroad, rather than by cutting back the
benefits received by other EU nationals in the UK. 4
79. Id. at §§ 3.32-3.33. NACAB evidence suggests that, in general,
housing authorities apply the habitual residence test more leniently than the
Benefits Agency.
80. Regulation 1612/68, 1968 OJ. (L 257) art. 7(2) ( "A 'worker' in this
context includes a person actually in work, including part-time work; someone
who has worked in the country but is now unable to do so due to permanent
illness or industrial injury, an unemployed person who has previously been
employed in the country and is now involuntarily unemployed; and someone
who has retired, having worked in the country for at least twelve months and
who has lived in the country for more than three years.").
81. NACAB, supra note 70, at § 2.13.
82. See Centre Public d'Aide Sociale de Courcelles v. Lebon, 1988 E.C.R.
2811.
83. NACAB, supa note 70, at § 2.26.
84. Id. at § 2.25.
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As it stands, the habitual residence test also applies to UK
citizens.85 In fact, about twenty percent of all applicants who
failed the habitual residence test during its first year were from
the UK.86 British citizens who have worked abroad will likely
have to reestablish that they are habitually resident before
becoming eligible for benefits.87 The Social Security Advisory
Committee recommended to the UK government that British cit-
izens returning from abroad be exempt from the test, but the
government did not follow the recommendation,88 perhaps
because EU law may have prevented such an exemption.
Whether British citizens return to the UK because of unemploy-
ment, ill health, marital or family problems, or fear of persecu-
tion, the habitual residence test may bar them from receiving
benefits in their home country.89
British citizens who were taken abroad as children are also
subject to the habitual residence test upon their return to the UK
as adults. It is likely the applicant's "centre of interest," one of
the factors used to determine habitual residence, will be deter-
mined by the Benefits Agency to be the same as that of the appli-
cant's parents, and the applicant will be denied benefits.90 The
NACAB report illustrates that a British national living abroad will
likely receive less favorable treatment under the benefit tourism
policy than an EU national who comes to the UK, works for a
short time, then becomes involuntarily unemployed.91 This
clearly contradicts the main objective of cutting down on EU
benefit tourism; nevertheless, the government stands by this
effect of the habitual residence test.9 2
C. A Policy of Racism?
The NACAB report provides some evidence that the benefit
tourism policy disproportionately affects minorities. Many Brit-
ish minorities have links to family or spouses abroad. The Social
85. See Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L 257) art. 7(2).
86. NACAB, supra note 70, at § 2.3 fig. 1.
87. Id. at § 2.34 (citing SSAC, supra note 73, at 3).
88. 1&
89. Id. at § 2.51.
90. Id. at § 2.55.
91. Id. at § 2.60.
92. Id. at § 2.62 ("It is perfectly reasonable that those who have made
their lives elsewhere in the world who were originally British citizens or who can
claim partial citizenship should be subject to the test. Why should someone
who has come over here on a backpacking holiday from Canada and who has
two British grandparents have the right to top up their income on holiday with
income support?") (quoting former Secretary of Social Security Peter Lilley,
January 23, 1995.).
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Security Advisory Committee warned that applicants who visit
their families or spouses overseas might fail the habitual resi-
dence test upon their return to the UK Although they may be
"well established in the UK," the visits abroad "may well be fre-
quent and extended and it is possible that, on return to the UK,
the adjudicating authorities could decide that the habitual resi-
dence qualification had not been fulfilled.""3
NACAB case studies confirm this phenomenon. The report
notes that male retirees from the Asian subcontinent are most
vulnerable.94 Despite the fact that one applicant had spent his
entire working life in Britain, had only left the UK for a short
period of time, and had been a British Army World War II vet-
eran, he was declared not to be habitually resident.95 The
NACAB report shows that British applicants with non-European
backgrounds may be denied income support benefits because
their "centre of interest" is not considered to be in the UK.96
When this phenomenon is compared to the relative ease
with which EU workers become eligible for benefits, the NACAB
accusation that the policy may have racist applications is under-
standable.97 While the overall effect is difficult to measure, the
evidence produced by the report gives an indication that the pol-
icy affects minorities unfavorably.98 The report urges that the
government begin monitoring to better track the effect of the
benefit tourism policy on minorities and protect against unfair
application of the habitual residence test:
It is not only patterns of living which may mean that black
and ethnic minority groups may be more likely to lose
their benefit under the habitual residence test; the judge-
ment whether a person is or is not habitually resident in
the UK is a subjective one. The danger is that, in making
that judgement, benefit officers and tribunals bring their
own prejudices and assumptions about race and culture to
bear.
99
V. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE HABITUAL RESIDENCE TEST
Any applicant may appeal a determination that he or she is
not habitually resident. The NACAB report suggests that a large
93. Id. at § 2.40; SSAC, supra iote 73, at 11.
94. Id. at § 2.42.
95. Id.
96. Id. at § 2.42.
97. Id. at § 2.43.
98. See id. at §§ 3.26-3.29.
99. Id. at § 2.84.
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number of appeals have been filed since the habitual residence
test came into effect.1"' The average success rate was thirty-nine
percent for appeals of denial of income support in 1995.101
However, the report claims that the appeals process takes too
long, considering the fact that many appellants are poor and
without income support during the time between rejection and
the appellate decision. Appeals to social security tribunals usu-
ally take between four and six months to process.'0 2 The NACAB
report recommends that this time period be shortened to four
weeks when an appellant has no other means of support. 03
Another option would be to provide interim payments of income
support to those appellants who have no other source of income.
Interim payments were provided, though rarely, to appellants
until February 1996, when they were completely abolished. 10 4
The NACAB report recommends that the government reinstate
interim payments pending determination of appeals.
10 5
Few cases challenging the habitual residence test have
reached the national court level. In fact, only one case has
directly challenged the test,106 and UK courts upheld the new
policy by finding in favor of the government both in the High
Court and on appeal. However, the habitual residence test
gained much greater attention shortly thereafter, when a local
council in London denied housing benefits to a pair of Euro-
pean nationals. Again, a UK court strengthened the habitual res-
idence test by finding against Gaudenzio Castelli and Jose
Tristan-Garcia. 107 The following year the Court of Appeal
reversed the decision and found in favor of the two Europeans,
dealing a severe blow to the policy. Another case, still pending in
the European Court, may soon determine the fate of the habitual
residence test.
A. The First Challenge: Urbanek, Sarwar, & Getachew
The habitual residence test came under attack shortly after
it was put into effect. The applicants in P?. v. Secretary of State ex p.
100. Id. at § 3.39.
101. Ma. at § 3.41. The success rate was 63% for appellants who were
represented by counsel.
102. Id. at § 4.24.
103. Id. at § 4.25.
104. Id. at § 4.28.
105. Id. at § 4.30.
106. R. v. Secretary of State ex p. Urbanek, Sarwar, & Getachew, Queen's
Bench Division (April 11, 1995) (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
107. R. v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Tristan-Garcia, 28
H.L.1R 125, 1995 Queen's Bench Division (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
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Urbanek, Sarwar, & Getachew1°8 were denied benefits because they
were declared not to be habitually resident. The three claims
were consolidated for the judgment, but the applicants attacked
the policy differently. While Sarwar claimed that the habitual res-
idence test was outside the scope of the Secretary of State's
power, the Urbaneks (a mother and adult son) and Getachew
claimed the habitual residence test violated the freedom of
movement rights guaranteed to EU nationals under Union law.
1. Ultra Vires: Sarwar's Claim
Sarwar's claim rested primarily on the Social Security Contri-
bution & Benefits Act ("the Benefits Act"), which states that "a
person in Great Britain is entitled to income support" provided
the person fulfills certain conditions of age, income, and various
other qualifications." °9 The conditions are set forth in income
support and housing benefit regulations; all regulation schemes
were amended in 1994 to include the habitual residence test.
The regulations provide that a "person from abroad" is not enti-
tled to benefits, and the amendments expand the definition of
"person from abroad" to include "a claimant who is not habitu-
ally resident in the United Kingdom. ..."1"
Sarwar claimed that the Benefits Act allows any person in
the UK access to income support benefits. Sarwar argued that
the habitual residence test allows the Secretary of State to place a
legislative limitation on the Benefits Act, which lies outside the
scope of the Secretary of State's power. The court construed the
Benefits Act as a whole, rather than in isolated sections, and
denied the ultra vires claim, stating that there is "no reason why a
test of habitual residence should be outside the rule-making
power of the Secretary of State.""'
2. European Union Questions: Urbanek & Getachew
The two remaining complaints focused on reconciliation of
the habitual residence test with the principle of freedom of
108. R. v. Secretary of State ex p. Urbanek, Sarwar, & Getachew, Queen's
Bench Division (April 11, 1995) (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
109. Social Security Contribution & Benefits Act, 1992, ch. 4, §§ 123, 124
(Eng.). Sarwar relied on a similar section of the Benefits Act with regard to
housing benefits. Section 130 provides that a "person is entitled to housing
benefit if ... he is liable to make payments in respect of a dwelling in Great
Britain which he occupies as his home...." Id. at § 130.
110. Income-Related Benefits Schemes (Miscellaneous Amendments)
(No.3) Regulations 1994, reg. 21(3) (SI 1994 No. 1807).
111. R. v. Secretary of State ex p. Urbanek, Sarwar, & Getachew, Queen's
Bench Division (April 11, 1995) (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
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movement in the European Union. The Urbaneks and
Getachew, all three EU nationals, referred to Articles Six and
Forty-Eight of the EU Treaty in their argument that the habitual
residence policy violates EU law.
Article Six states that "any discrimination on grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited."' 1 2 The judgment admitted the
possibility that "to give rights to habitual residents of the UK and
the Republic of Ireland, and not to persons habitually resident in
other countries of the [EU], can amount to discrimination on
grounds of nationality . ,,11' The court quickly qualified this
statement by referring to Article Forty-Eight in the context of the
case of Centre Public d'Aide Sociale de Courcelles v. Lebon.1 14 In
Lebon, the European Court of Justice held that only workers, not
work seekers or the unemployed, are entitled to Article Forty-
Eight protection. Because the Urbaneks and Getachew were
unemployed, the court denied them protection under Article
Forty-Eight and held them subject to the habitual residence test.
The applicants also argued that the habitual residence test is
discriminatory because it confers automatic habitual residency
on citizens of the Republic of Ireland, while other EU nationals
are subject to the test.1 15 The court rejected this contention as
well, referring to the case of Belgian State v. HumbeL" 6 The
Humbel case involved a Belgian law that exempted citizens of
both Belgium and Luxembourg from a school enrollment fee,
while subjecting other EU nationals to the fee. Humbel, a
French citizen, complained of discrimination, but his claim was
denied. 17 The Sarwar, Urbanek, & Getachew court dismissed the
applicants' claims in much the same fashion as Humbe4 stating
that "[t]here is nothing unusual in the concept that rights of
movement and rights of residence within the [EU] do not neces-
sarily carry with them rights to maintenance."" 8 The Court of
Appeal subsequently affirmed the lower court decision with
respect to all the applicants." 9 The habitual residence test had
survived its first, though certainly not its last, major challenge.
112. EU TRrY art. 6.
113. R. v. Secretary of State ex p. Urbanek, Sarwar, & Getachew, Queen's
Bench Division (April 11, 1995) (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
114. 1988 E.C.R. 2811.
115. See supra note 58.
116. 1 C.M.L.R- 393 (1989).
117. Id. at 402.
118. R. v. Secretary of State ex p. Urbanek, Sarwar, & Getachew, Queen's
Bench Division (April 11, 1995) (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file) (citing Brown v.
Secretary of State for Scotland, 1988 E.C.R. 3205).
119. R v. Secretary of State for Soc. Sec., ex p. Sarwar & Another, Court
of Appeal (Civil Division) (Oct. 24, 1996) (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
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B. Reversal of Fortune: Castelli & Tristan-Garcia
1. Castelli
Gaudenzio Castelli, an Italian citizen, came to the United
Kingdom in March 1994. By February 1995, his business plans
had failed and he was no longer able to support himself. In addi-
tion, Castelli's health had deteriorated; he would later be diag-
nosed as HIV positive. Castelli applied for housing and income
benefits from the Westminster City Council. The council
granted Castelli temporary accommodation under the Housing
Act.1 20 However, the council later denied Castelli's application
because he had failed the habitual residence test established by
the new benefit guidelines. The council claimed it owed no duty
to Castelli under the Housing Act, and further stated that Castelli
had no right to reside in the United Kingdom.121
Castelli appealed the council's decision to an independent
social security tribunal. The tribunal found Castelli to be habitu-
ally resident in the United Kingdom and homeless under the cri-
teria of the Housing Act. 1 2 2 The tribunal declared that his
government benefits should be reinstated. 123 Despite the tribu-
nal's ruling, the council did not reinstate Castelli's benefits, stat-
ing that Castelli was not a "qualified person. . . lawfully resident
under [EU] law. . " ,124 Castelli sought relief from the High
Court.
2. Tristan-Garcia
Jose Tristan-Garcia faced a similar situation. He arrived
from Spain in 1993, worked in England for several months, and
returned to Spain in early 1994.125 Tristan-Garcia returned to
the United Kingdom in February of that year and was unem-
ployed until August 1995.126 He drew income support and hous-
ing benefits from June 1994 until April 4, 1995, when he received
the following letter from the Immigration and Nationality
Department:
120. Housing Act, supra note 39, at § 63 ("Interim Duty to Accommodate
in Case of Apparent Priority Need").
121. R. v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Tristan-Garcia, 28
H.L.R. 125, 1995 Queen's Bench Division (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
122. Castelli's poor health was sufficient to meet the requirement of




126. R v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Tristan-Garcia, 28
H.L.R 125, 1995 Queen's Bench Division (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
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Dear Sir,
It has come to the notice of this Department that you have
claimed income support since [June 17, 1994] and that
you are still continuing to claim.
I should like to explain that as [an EU] national you are
free to enter and reside in the United Kingdom in order to
exercise Treaty rights conferred by the [EU Treaty]. These
include the right to seek or take employment, or to reside
here in a non-economic capacity provided that you have
enough resources to avoid being a burden on public funds.
However, according to our records you are not in employ-
ment, self-employment or business, nor are you seeking
work with a genuine chance of obtaining work. The Secre-
tary of State is therefore not satisfied that you are lawfully
resident here under [EU] law and you should now make
arrangements to leave the United Kingdom.
I should add that if you do not leave the United Kingdom
on a voluntary basis then, in the present circumstances of
your case, we will not take steps to enforce your departure
from the United Kingdom.
127
On April 24, 1995, the council informed Tristan-Garcia that
he would no longer receive benefits; in a letter to Tristan-Garcia,
the council included a copy of the April 4 IND letter. 128 Despite
IND's suggestion that he leave the country, Tristan-Garcia
remained in England. He successfully appealed the council's
decision, and his benefits were reinstated.1 2 Nevertheless, Tris-
tan-Garcia sought damages from the council for a breach of stat-
utory duty under the Housing Act.
3. Holding of the High Court
Castelli and Tristan-Garcia agreed to let the High Court con-
solidate their applications. The court ruled in favor of the coun-
cil and affirmed the right of local housing authorities to make
decisions regarding the citizenship status of applicants. 1" The
Castelli court relied heavily on the Tower Hamlets decision.
Once the propriety of the council's decision-making powers
had been decided, the court then evaluated the extent to which
Castelli and Tristan-Garcia had a right to receive benefits in the
United Kingdom. The court ruled that Castelli and Tristan-Gar-





cia were not within the bounds of their EU freedom of move-
ment rights at the time of their applications for housing.
13 1
In an attempt to distinguish Tower Hamlets from the Castelli
case, the two applicants pointed to a concurring opinion in Tower
Hamlets by Sir Thomas Bingham, the Master of the Rolls:132
Once the immigration authorities make clear, by words or
conduct, that they do not intend to seek the removal of an
immigrant whether he be an illegal entrant or not, the
housing authority may no longer rely on entry by decep-
tion to refuse public housing; at that point the immigrant
forms part of the country's long-term, resident population,
having the same rights as any other person.
133
The applicants then pointed to the IND letter of April 4,
1995, and alleged that because the IND stated it would take no
action to remove the applicants from the United Kingdom, they
had become a part of the resident population as described in Sir
Thomas' opinion. The court dismissed this argument, calling it a
"distortion" of the IND letter.134 The court analyzed the IND let-
ter and concluded that while there was room for argument
regarding its meaning, it should not be construed as granting a
right of residence: "Local housing authorities could not as a mat-
ter of common sense be expected to house those whom the
immigration authorities regarded as unlawfully present and
required to leave. Parliament did not so intend."
1 35
The court further emphasized common sense, stating that
when EU nationals become a burden on a Member State, they
should "head home."' 36 Concluding that the housing authority
had ultimately made the correct decision in both cases, the court
denied the applicants' claims. They sought review from the
Court of Appeal.
4. Court of Appeal Reversal
With regard to Tristan-Garcia's claim, the Court of Appeal
adopted the more lenient interpretation of the IND letter
announcing Garcia's presence as an overstayer. The court held
131. R. v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Tristan-Garcia, 28
H.L.R. 125, 1995 Queen's Bench Division (LEXIS, UK library, Allcas file).
132. The Master of the Rolls is the head of the Civil Division of the Court
of Appeal. For a brief discussion of recent Masters, including Sir Thomas
Bingham, see JosHuA ROZENBERG, TE SEARCH FOR JusTicE 40-43 (1994).
133. 3 All E.R. 439, 447 (1993).
134. R v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Tristan-Garcia, 28
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that the "somewhat elliptical communication" by the IND did not
signify that Garcia was no longer lawfully present in the UK'1
3 7
Rather, the letter was more like "the reaction of a reluctant
host-'I would rather that you left, but I will not force you to
go., ,138 In the eyes of the Court of Appeal, mere suggestions
that an applicant leave the country were not enough to result in
the status of being "not lawfully present" in the UK The lower
court holding against Tristan-Garcia was reversed.'1
9
Because Castelli did not receive a similar letter from IND,
the court performed a separate analysis for his claim. Here the
UK authorities had not informed Castelli that he had exceeded
his lawful stay in Britain. Officially, despite the decision of the
Westminster housing council, Castelli still had all the rights and
privileges of an EU national lawfully present in the UK The
court therefore held that Castelli still deserved temporary accom-
modation under the Housing Act because he did not belong to a
prohibited category.140 The lower court holding against Castelli
was also reversed.
14'
5. Reconciliation or Downfall?
The leading opinion in the Court of Appeal decision
asserted that Castelli did not conflict with the ruling in the Tower
Hamlets case.' 42 While that decision allowed local housing coun-
cils to decide the immigration status of applicants, the Castelli
court emphasized that such local rulings have no official author-
ity and are merely to be conducted for the purpose of the local
housing council's determination of eligibility for housing bene-
fits. 143 In other words, an EU national is only officially "not law-
fully present" when the national authorities declare it so. The
court stated this was preferable not only to avoid conflicts
between local and national government, but also to "reduce the
risk of failures, even if inadvertent, to comply with [EU] Treaty
obligations."144
The Castelli opinion seems to resolve some of the tension
between the Antonissen decision and the Tower Hamlets case.
137. R_ v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Another, 28 H.L.R_





142. R. v. Westminster City Council ex p. Castelli & Another, 28 H.L.R.




Local authorities may make determinations of immigration sta-
tus, but only for local purposes. The local decisions carry no offi-
cial weight on a national or supranational level. The Castelli
decision should aid EU nationals in their quest to appeal a denial
of benefits without fear that the local authority decision on immi-
gration status will block the appeal. However, it raises some
doubts about the efficiency of the system. Why take the time of
the local authorities by requiring them to perform a task for
which they have no binding decision-making power? The answer
appears to come from the fact that local authorities have to make
a decision quickly, especially regarding temporary accommoda-
tion, and may not have time to wait for every application to be
processed by IND. Conversely, when IND is forced to make a
decision on the status of a potential overstayer, it might simply
rely on the earlier, non-binding decision of the local authority in
the interest of efficiency. If this were the case, the non-binding
status of local authorities would take on a de facto binding
nature over time, depending on the number and types of cases
that reach the courts on appeal.
The IND policy on overstayers raises questions as well. If
IND had been certain of Tristan-Garcia's status, it should have
taken steps to remove him under the auspices of the Immigra-
tion Rules, rather than supply him with ambiguous suggestions
and veiled threats. The imprecise nature of the letter gives the
impression that IND may be wary of drawing EU attention to its
policy regarding EU "immigrants." Too much restriction on
freedom of movement would eventually draw such attention. On
the other hand, complete freedom of access to the United King-
dom would open the door to benefit tourism and fraud.
The benefit tourism policy arguably gives local authorities
and the Benefits Agency an effective right to rule on the eligibil-
ity of EU applicants. If an applicant is determined to be a worker
under the relevant EU regulation,145 the applicant will be
exempt from the habitual residence test. However, if the work is
considered by authorities to be marginal or ancillary the appli-
cant's worker status may be denied,146 and the applicant will be
forced to comply with the test. Antonissen warned against giving
national legislatures too much power to limit rights of residence;
it is reasonable to suggest local authorities and the Benefits
Agency would be given even less respect by the European Court
ofJustice. Though this may be a distinction without a difference,
145. Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L 257).
146. See Case 357/89, Raulin v. Minister van Onderwijs en
Wetenschappen, 1992 E.C.R 1027.
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the true test of the policy will come when the European Union
renders a decision on the viability of the UK habitual residence
test.
Such a decision may come sooner than the UK government
would like. Though the European Commission147 signaled its
general approval of the habitual residence test early last year, 148 a
British social security commissioner recently submitted a habitual
residence case to the European Court of Justice. 149 The case
concerns Robin Swaddling, a UK citizen who worked in France
for fifteen years only to return in 1995, and find he had become
ineligible for benefits. 50 The commissioner reinstated Swad-
dling's benefits, but sent the case to the European Court to
determine whether his benefits should have been denied in the
first instance."' Despite the favorable ruling from the European
Commission, it is possible the European Court of Justice will find
fault with the specific facts surrounding the UK habitual resi-
dence policy and rule against the government. Ironically, it
would be the UK's treatment of its own citizens, rather than EU
nationals, that would bring the benefit tourism policy to an end.
VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
A. Suggestions for the UK
The habitual residence test causes more trouble than it is
worth. The government's policy to stop benefit tourists is a hap-
hazard and subjective approach to solving the problem of entitle-
ments fraud by foreign nationals. In addition, the NACAB report
shows that the test harms UK citizens in the process. Serious
reforms are in order if the government chooses to, and is able to,
continue applying the policy.
The test used to detect benefit tourists should be largely
objective, rather than a subjective habitual residence test based
on vague criteria. Benefits should be allowed, provided the
applicant gives the proper information to show qualification as a
UK citizen, EU worker, or other acceptable benefit recipient.
The concept of freedom of movement in the EU would prevent
the UK from moving to a strict system similar to the one set up by
147. The European Commission is the bureaucratic wing of the EU,
composed of representatives from each Member State. See generally BgrnsH
Poixrv, supra note 29, at 250-53.
148. Commission Decision 96/172, 1996 O.J. (L 49).





the Personal Responsibility Act in the United States. However, a
passport from an EU Member State, stamped with the date of
entry, would be sufficient to alert the benefit authorities to an
individual's status as an overstayer (i.e., an EU applicant either
will have proof of employment, will have been in the UK less
than six months, or will be an overstayer). The authorities could
also require proof of employment to establish that an individual
qualifies as an EU worker rather than a work seeker. The vague
concept of "marginal and ancillary" employment should be
replaced by well-defined criteria such as number of hours worked
per week.
Whatever the objective criteria used, the same criteria
should apply to all benefit applicants, whether applying for hous-
ing or income benefits. A joint council composed of agents of
the Central Adjudication Service and the Department of Social
Security should convene to construct a uniform system of guide-
lines. Common, objective guidelines should remove some of the
structural problems associated with control of the benefit appli-
cation process by two separate agencies. Section 432 of the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act, for example, calls for the United States
Attorney General to "promulgate regulations requiring verifica-
tion that a person applying for a Federal public benefit... is a
qualified alien and is eligible to receive such benefit."1 5 2 The
regulations are to be designed in such a way that they determine
eligibility in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. 58 Responsi-
bility should similarly fall upon the United Kingdom Secretary of
State for Social Security to establish uniform, objective rules to
be used by both the Benefits Agency and the local housing
councils.
The UK government might also recall the Browne ruling and
attempt to develop some kind of EU-wide entitlements transfer
system among the EU nations. True benefit tourists would prob-
ably be unable to establish a local connection in the UK. If bene-
fit applicants cannot show a recent connection to the UK, either
through employment or residence, housing councils or the Ben-
efits Agency should be able to transfer the application back to
the applicant's home country. Through the Browne method, the
UK could avoid attracting welfare seekers while still standing by
the principle of freedom of movement. This could become a
152. Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 1, at § 432(a). Subsection
(b) requires the several states to construct verification plans that comply with
the federal regulations.
153. Id. at § 432(a)(2).
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Whatever reforms are made, and whether or not the habit-
ual residence test stands, the UK should realize that the benefit
tourism problem stems from the UK's voluntary involvement in
the EU. Membership in this supranational organization entails
some sacrifice. By ascribing to the principle of freedom of move-
ment, the UK signals its approval of an open-door, or at least a
six-month revolving door, policy on immigration where EU
nationals are concerned. While there are some exceptions to
this principle, the UK should look to the EU for resolution of the
problem, rather than trying to work alone against the "advancing
tide" of EU nationals. By taking a defensive stance against
"Euroscroungers," the UK government may alienate itself from
other Member States and do more harm than good in the long
run.
B. Learning from the UK
The US would do well to observe the problems the UK has
encountered with its welfare system. The structural problems
with the administration of benefits should be less troublesome in
the US than in the UK, as federal regulations implementing the
new Personal Responsibility Act will be uniform throughout the
US. State regulations may go beyond the federal guidelines, but
must meet the minimum federal requirements. Differences
among the welfare systems of the several states will be under-
standable simply because the US has a federal system, unlike the
unitary government in the UK.
The US should avoid the subjective, vague criteria surround-
ing the habitual residence test. Future intentions and "centres of
interest" can be dangerous requirements when applied on a
grand scale. If the US were to employ such criteria in determin-
ing eligibility for benefits, cries of racism and bias would inevita-
bly, and rightfully, follow. It is of vital importance that uniform
documentation and other objective criteria be used at both the
state and federal levels in order to avoid the denial of benefits to
American citizens who, like some minorities in the UK,155 might
fail a test based on indeterminate requirements.
The US is not part of a supranational organization espous-
ing freedom of movement. It is free as a sovereign nation to con-
154. See Michael Elliott, Hey, Can You Spare a "Euro?, "NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17,
1997, at 48 (discussing the likelihood of European monetary union, and a
single "Euro" currency, by 2002).
155. See text accompanying notes 93-99.
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trol its own borders, as well as its distribution of entitlements. It
need not concern itself, at least at present, with the possibility of
another nation or group of nations forcing its legislature to
adopt an immigration policy that may seem contrary to its best
interests, as the Eurosceptics in Britain would argue the EU has
done. However, US policy-makers should consider what the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act does in terms of its effect, both economi-
cally and psychologically, on the incoming legal immigrant
population. By restricting their access to benefits, the US is
doing more than deterring immigrants' dependence on "public
resources to meet their needs," or ensuring that "public benefits
not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United
States." 156 The US is also sending legal immigrants a clear
message: they are not as welcome as the rest of the resident pop-
ulation; they do not deserve the full benefits of life in America-
at least, not for the first five years. In short, the Personal Respon-
sibility Act tells legal immigrants that they are a "them," rather
than an "us." Such a policy may result in divisions along lines of
ethnicity and national origin as legal immigrants are gradually
assimilated into the population. Americans should ask them-
selves whether the cost of those divisions would outweigh the sav-
ings from this partial closure of the US "open-door" policy on
immigration.
156. Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 1, at § 400(2) (A) & (B).
1997]

